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SEPARATION OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THE OPERATING ROOM:
THE BORROWED SERVANT, THE CAPTAIN OF THE SHIP,
AND THE SCOPE OF SURGEONS' VICARIOUS LIABILITY
In a modem hospital a patient admitted for surgery is placed into the hands
of a rather large number of persons, each of whom performs a function which,
in varying degrees, may have an effect upon the course of, if not the result of,
the surgical procedure itself. By the very fact of hospitalization, and even more
so by the fact of having surgery performed, a very special set of circumstances
and very important set of relationships come into being. The patient is ill and
in strange surroundings; he finds himself in the unusual position of having much
of the responsibility for his well-being given to others; indeed, in the operating
room his life is literally in the hands of the surgical team. Because of the importance society has placed upon this setting, there has grown up an elaborate
framework or structure to handle the care of the individual. With the health
and safety of the patient so dependent upon this framework, there exists a fertile
breeding ground for legal action whenever some aspect of care has been negligently performed. One aspect of such legal action is the vicarious liability of
surgeons.
Growing primarily out of the doctrine of respondeat superior, a broader
concept of vicarious liability arose in certain situations to place liability for
negligently caused injuries occurring in the operating room upon the surgeon
in charge of the operation. He may incur this liability despite the fact that his
action was not the direct or proximate cause of the injury and despite the fact
that he did not employ, in the ordinary sense, the individual whose action was
the proximate cause of the injury. It has been argued in support of this result
that the surgeon is the temporary employer of those persons working with him
in the operating room, that they are his borrowed servants, or that his general
position of being in charge of the operation makes him a "captain of the ship"
and liable for the negligence of his inferiors.
In recent years this responsibility of the surgeon has been the subject of
some disagreement and conflict in decisions. The purpose of this note will be to
outline the nature and scope of the surgeon's vicarious liability and to examine
a theory of proper separation of responsibility within the operating room.
I. Introduction
A. Vicarious Liability Generally
The doctrine of vicarious liability has been a familiar legal concept since
the days of primitive law. The principle appears, at first glance, to be a simple
one: liability without fault. Because of the relationship existing between A and
B, the negligence of A is charged to B, and B is liable to an injured third party,
"although B has played no part in it, has done nothing whatever to aid or encourage it, or indeed has done all that he possibly can to prevent it."' In earlier
1
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times the result was justified under a number of insufficient theories,2 including
natural justice, a fiction of implied command from the master to the servant, a
belief that the party who sets the force in motion initially ought to be responsible
for its consequences, and the necessity for forcing upon masters the careful choice
of servants. It has even been advocated because of the employer's "deep
pocket,"' an approach which at least de-emphasizes a search for justice.
More recently, justification for the principle of vicarious liability has been
found in the control or right of control of a master over his servant. Furthermore,
it is now universally accepted that the doctrine is in fact rooted in public policy.4
B. Respondeat Superior and Surgeons' Liability
The most common basis for a surgeon's liability for the negligence of another is founded upon the doctrine of respondeat superior,which holds the physician liable for the negligence of his employees.5 The liability stems from the
master-servant relationship and most commonly concerns the action of a nurse,
assistant, or technician who is on the payroll of the defendant physician. A full
discussion of respondeat superior is beyond the scope of this note, and consequently, there will be only a short mention here of some of the general principles which will have a bearing upon this article's subject matter.
To begin with, the physician will not be vicariously liable unless his employee was both directly liable for the damages and was also acting within the
scope of his employment.' Furthermore, the negligent party must qualify as a
servant of the physician master. Here, this issue is easily resolved, assuming that
there is the normal employer-employee relationship, but the matter becomes
both crucial and more complicated when the concepts of "borrowed servant"
and "captain of the ship" are considered. The Restatement of Agency defines
a servant as follows:
A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another
and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the
services is subject to the other's control or right to control.7
One form or another of this definition is crucial to the outcome of cases seeking
to hold a surgeon liable for the negligence of those with whom he works for only
a short period of time in the operating room.
2
3

4

See Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.. 105, 107-11 (1916).
T. BATY, VIcARIous LIABILiTY 154 (1916).
W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 459; Laski, supra note 2, at 111;

If that employer is compelled to bear the burden of his servant's torts even when
he himself is personally without fault, it is because in a social distribution of profit
and loss, the balance of least disturbance seems thereby best to be obtained.
Id. at 112.
5 See 1 D. LOUiSELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE I 16.01 and 16.02 (1960).
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 251 (1958):
A principal is subject to liability for physical harm to the person or the tangible
things of another caused by the negligence of a servant or a non-servant agent:
(a) in the performance of an act which the principal is under a duty to have
performed with care;
See W. PROSSaR, supra note 1, at 460-66.
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP AGENCY § 220(1) (1958).
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II. The Borrowed Servant and Captain of the Ship Doctrines
It is clear that the principles of vicarious liability and respondeat superior
are not limited in their application to the common employer-employee relationship discussed above. A person need not be on the payroll in order to qualify as
a servant, although salary may be evidence of a master-servant relationship.'
This principle is recognized by the Restatement (Second) of Agency:
Servant Lent to Another Master
A servant directed or permitted by his master to perform services for another
He may
may become the servant of such other in performing the services.
9
become the other's servant as to some acts and not as to others.
This concept has been known as the "borrowed (or loaned) servant" doctrine; it has a common application in the area of medical malpractice which
stems from the working relationship between a staff physician and various employees of a hospital. It has often been found that certain hospital employees
have become, in a specific task, the borrowed servants of the physician, particularly the surgeon in charge of a procedure in the operating room, whose control
and authority over those employees have been likened to that of the captain of
a ship over his crew. The doctrine thus serves to subject the surgeon to vicarious
liability for the negligence of those hospital employees who have become his
temporary or borrowed servants. The basic idea is straightforward yet there is
a great deal of complexity and disagreement concerning the circumstances under
which a negligent party may be considered a servant and of whom that person
is a servant. Several tests or criteria have been proposed for making this determuination.
A. Control: The Borrowed Servant
The basic and most commonly applied test to determine the existence of a
master-servant relationship centers around the concept of control or right of
control."0 As one court put the test: "He is to be deemed the master who has
the supreme choice, control and direction of the servant and whose will the
servant represents, not merely in the result of his work, but in all of its details.""
In the simple employer-employee relationship, control is really presumed, and the
central issue is whether the employee is acting "within the scope of his employment." 2 However, with regard to a borrowed servant, the issue is complicated
by the existence of more than one potential master, each exercising some degree
of control over the servant. This duality of control has been described as an
ambiguity between short term and long term control,"' and the same concept
8 See id. 1 220(2) (g).
9 Id. 227.
10 See id. § 220(1),'(2) (a).
11 Ramsey v. New York Central R.R. Co., 269 N.Y. 219, 224, 199 N.E. 65, 66 (1935)
(citation omitted).
12

See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 460-66.

13 Smith, Scope of the Business: The Borrowed Servant Problem, 38 Mom. L. Rxv. 1222,
1230 (1940).
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has been found in many of the malpractice cases in a confusion over whether
the test is in fact based upon actual control or rather upon simply the right to
control.
It is important to remember that however one characterizes the test, the
issue remains vicarious liability. The whole matter of control does not explain
why vicarious liability is imposed, but rather it only serves to guide in the determination of when the master-servant relationship (a prerequisite for vicarious
liability) exists. Courts that have chosen to look for actual control have used
several guidelines and have ostensibly based their inquiry upon the factual circumstances of each case.
1. Presence or Absence of the Surgeon
The actual control approach to the master-servant relationship tends to
focus upon the ability of the master to tell the worker what to do, how to do it,
and when it should be done. 4 In terms of the vicarious liability of a surgeon
for the negligence of hospital employees, many decisions have turned upon the
presence or absence of the surgeon, perhaps reflecting the view that the hospital
employees are primarily servants of the hospital except in those cases where the
surgeon has borrowed them and is with them, directing their activities.
One line of cases which dearly shows this principle has consistently denied
the vicarious liability of a surgeon for the negligence of hospital employees in
carrying out an order for medication or treatment. Such an order may be written
on the patient's medical chart, phoned in to the hospital, or even given verbally;
the point is that the order is merely that the patient is to receive something at
a certain time or times of the day. Perhaps the most common example is the
order for medication, where an injection is negligently given, 5 the wrong medication is given,' 6 or the wrong dosage is given.'7 In these cases the surgeon (or
other physician) has not attempted, nor would he be expected, to actually supervise or direct the administering of the injection. There is no question that the
physician, should he choose to do so, could come to the hospital and actually
direct the hospital employee. However, he is not actually controlling the activity,
regardless of any right to control, which is determinative in these cases. Vicarious
liability has been denied in similar instances of the physician's absence as well.' 8
Many cases focusing upon actual control have found the physician vicariously liable based on his presence and supervision. One such case is Aderhold
14 Comment, The Loaned Servant Doctrine, 29 TENN. L. Rav. 448 (1962); see Skogland,
Borrowed Servants, 76 CoMm. L.J. 307, 309-13 (1971).
15 Moore v. Guthrie Hospital, 403 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1968); Hohenthal v. Smith, 114
F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Bria v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 153 Conn. 626, 220 A.2d 29
(1966); Graham v. St. Luke's Hospital, 46 Ill. App. 2d 147, 196 N.E.2d 355 (1964); Massey
v. Heine, 497 S.W.2d 564 (Ky. 1973).
16 Hallinan v. Prindle, 17 Cal. App. 2d 656, 62 P.2d 1075 (1936); Abercrombie v. Roof,
64 Ohio App. 365, 28 N.E.2d 772 (1940).
17 Harlan v. Bryant, 87 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1936).
18 Rose v. Hakim, 335 F. Supp. 1221 (D.D.C. 1971) (insufficient hospital equipment to
cope with post-operative emergency in the intensive care unit); Sherman v. Hartman, 137
Cal. App. 2d 589, 290 P.2d 894 (1955) (post-operative allowing of transfusion needle to
slip); Abbe v. Woman's Hospital Ass'n., 35 Mich. App. 429, 192 N.W.2d 691 '(1971)
(physician not liable for acts in fact performed by the hospital through its employees).
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v. Bishop ' based on an operating room setting. The plaintiff was undergoing
an operation for the removal of a goiter when she sustained burns on both feet,
caused by the negligence of the operating room nurse and other hospital-employed assistants. The court held that the nurse's negligence was imputable
to the operating surgeon's stating:
While the head nurse and her assistants were the general employees of
the [hospital], they were, nevertheless, during the time required for the
actual operation, under the direction and supervision of the operating
surgeons, and were the servants of the operating surgeons in respect to such
services as were rendered by them in the performance of the operation, and
in the performance of
for any negligence on the part of such employees
20
such services the operating surgeons are liable.
The court went on to make it clear that actual control was what was required,
stating:
[TJhe true test of the existence of the relation of master and servant in a
given case does not depend upon whether the servant was in the general
employ.of the master, but upon whether the master actually exercises
and control over the servant during the time he uses such
supervision
21
servant.
An excellent illustration of the distinction between the actual control and
the right to control approaches may be found in Martin v. Perth Amboy General
Hospital.22 Plaintiff underwent surgery for the removal of an obstruction in his
abdominal aorta. It was later discovered that during the operation a laparotomy
pad (surgical sponge) had been left in the plaintiff's abdomen. Recognizing the
accepted New Jersey view that a sponge count was the duty of the nurse acting
as a servant of the hospital, the court nevertheless found the surgeon vicariously
liable because he had instructed the nurse to remove the ring normally attached
to such sponges to facilitate locating the sponges during an operation.
Other cases have also based the vicarious liability of the surgeon upon direct
control, evidenced at least in part, by his presence.28
2. Expertise of the Servant
It should be pointed out that, as used here, the phrase, "expertise of the

servant," is a contradiction in terms. A number of cases have found that the
19 221 P. 752 (Okla. 1923).
20 Id. at 754.
21 Id. at 755 (emphasis added).
22 104 N.J. Super. 335, 250 A.2d 40 (1969).
23 It is important to point out that in these cases and in Martin the directness of the
surgeon's control goes to establishing the master-servant relationship and not to establishing
any direct negligence on the part of the surgeon himself.
Surgeon present and liable: Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal. 2d 82, 64 P.2d 409 (1936)); Beadles
v. Metayaka, 135 Colo. 366, 311 P.2d 711 (1957); Frazier v. Hurd, 6 Mich. App. 317, 149
N.W.2d 226 (1967); Webb v. Joins, 488 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. 1972); Minogue v. Rutland
Hospital, 119 Vt. 336. 125 A.2d 796 (1956).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER[

[April 1974]

surgeon is not vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a member of the surgical
team where the negligent party is acting in a sphere in which he is an expert.
The two most common areas of the application of this principle are the negligence
of a medical specialist to whom the patient has been referred and the negligence
of an anesthesiologist in the operating room.
In Seneris v. Haas,' an obstetrician was held not vicariously liable for the
negligence of an anesthesiologist who administered a spinal anesthetic negligently where it appeared that the obstetrician was not present until the anesthetic had been given. Yet, the presence or absence of the surgeon is not determinative under this theory. In Marvulli v. Elshire25 the plaintiff was undergoing surgery when she suffered an adverse reaction (hypoxia) to the anesthetic.
The surgeon was present during the mishap, and yet the court ruled that he
could not be held vicariously liable for any negligence of the anesthesiologist,
who was a specialist in his field.
The rationale of isolating the surgeon, although he is in one sense in charge
of the operation, from vicarious liability is that each physician (the surgeon and
the anesthesiologist) performs separate and distinct work independent of the
other, and unless there is evidence of medical practice or custom to the contrary,
the negligence of one is separate from the negligence of the other.2" The anesthesiologist, qualified in a specialized field of medicine, is given the entire charge
of the administration of the anesthetic; his individual expertise precludes a
master-servant relationship.2
The second area of concern under the "expertise" test is the negligence of
a specialist to whom the patient has been referred. This issue is rather easily
resolved. The vast majority of the courts hold that there is no liability without
some sort of direct negligence.2" An example of this principle is found in Collins
v. Hand." The plaintiff brought an action against her physician on the theory
of respondeat superior for the negligence of members of a team administering
electroshock therapy. The court found that since the doctor had not administered
such treatments personally for a considerable length of time, he was seeking to
have the matter handled by experts; and thus he had neither effective control
nor the right to control their activities.
A similar case is Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees,0
which raised the issue of the liability of a thoracic and cardiovascular surgeon
for the negligence of a hospital team in performing a specialized diagnostic procedure (an aortography). The court held that the surgeon could not be vicariously
liable for acts over which he had and could have no control, noting that:
[T]o hold that the attending surgeon who does not participate ... in the
procedure is liable for the acts of a competent team supplied by the hospital
24 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955).
25 27 Cal. App. 3d 180, 103 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1972).
26 See Wiley v. Wharton, 68 Ohio App. 345, 41 N.E.2d 255 (1941).
27 See Thompson v. Lillehei, 164 F. Supp. 716 (D. Minn. 1958), aff'd, 273 F.2d 376
(8th Cir. 1959); Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560,

573, 317 P.2d 170, 178 (1957).
28
29
30

See Annot.. 85 A.L.R.2d 889, 905-07 (1962).
431 Pa. 378, 246 A.2d 398 (1968).
154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 '(1957).
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would be against the best interests of patients generally. The patient by
the use of such a team gets the benefit of medical people who have become
experts in the particular procedure. 3 '
The defendant surgeon had arranged for the special procedure to be done by the
hospital team under the direction of a physician whose expertise was founded
on five years' experience in surgery as well as on his position of being in charge
of all special diagnostic procedures having to do with the injection of radiopaque or contrast material into the blood vessels.
Cases decided upon the "expertise" test often place a great deal of significance upon established medical practice or custom, giving some latitude to the
medical profession to seek better care for patients through increased specialization. 2
3. Medical Versus Nursing or Routine Tasks
There is a line of cases that seeks to distinguish between "medical" and
"nursing" procedures in order to determine whether control exists." It is a
somewhat difficult distinction to make when placed in that framework. As
mentioned above, there is indeed a line of cases giving cognizance to the independent nature of treatment administered by floor nurses and interns in the regular
course of service furnished by a hospital. The basic point of such cases is that
the physician will not be held vicariously liable for acts negligently performed
in his absence by hospital personnel where such treatments are of the type that
are expected to be performed in a routine manner. In this sense, these cases are
analogous to the "expertise" cases, because the courts will look to recognized
medical practice and custom and will decide upon the physician's liability according to the propriety of his having delegated the task.
However, there are a number of cases that take a similar distinction even
further, applying the test in situations where the physician is actually present
when the negligent act occurs. These cases recognize a sphere of activity for
certain hospital personnel over which the physician will not ordinarily exercise
control. Such an activity could be a sponge or instrument count during an
operation3 4 or the preparation of a particular machine to be used by the surgeon
during the operation. 5
This minority view seems to recognize some vague form of division of
responsibility among all members of the medical care team. However, it is subject to the criticism that it ignores the basic thrust of vicarious liability because
31
32
33

Id. at 574, 317 P.2d at 178-79.
See discussion in text corresponding to notes 58-76 infra.
See 50 GEo. L.J. 329, 332 (1961).

34 Hall v. Grosvenor, 267 Ill. App. 119 (1932); Olander v. Johnson, 258 Ill. App. 89

(1930); Grant v. Touro Infirmary, 254 La. 204, 223 So. 2d 148 (1969); Martin v. Perth
Amboy General Hospital, 104 N.J. Super. 335, 250 A.2d 40 (1969).
35 Clary v. Christiansen, 54 Ohio L. Abs. 254, 83 N.E.2d 644 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948);
May v. Broun, 261 Ore. 28, 492 P.2d 776 (1972). See also Nichter v. Edmiston, 81 Nev. 606,
407 P.2d 721 (1965) '(application of excessive amount of disinfectant is not subject to
surgeon's direct control).
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it focuses too closely upon the factual circumstances and overlooks the principle
that vicarious liability is a creature of policy. 6
B. Right to Control: Captain of the Ship
The captain of the ship doctrine had an inauspicious beginning in Pennsylvania in the case of McConnell v. Williams,"7 where the court removed a nonsuit in favor of an obstetrician by holding that there was a factual question for
the jury, under familiar agency principles, as to whether the obstetrician could
be vicariously liable for the negligence of an assisting intern. In deciding that
issue the court stated:
[I]n the course of an operation in the operating room of the hospital, and
until the surgeon leaves the room at the conclusion of the operation ...
he is in the same complete charge of those who are present and assisting
him as is the captain of the ship over all on board. ss
The decision simply applied basic agency principles to medical malpractice
actions by bringing the concept of the "borrowed servant" to the setting of the
operating room. 9 The principle was followed in the similar case of Benedict v.
Bondi,4 where the court removed a non-suit in favor of a surgeon who was
supervising a nurse in a preoperative procedure when she negligently burned the
patient.
It seemed clear from these two decisions that the captain of the ship doctrine was not an extension of the borrowed servant concept, but rather a mere
analogy describing the type of control which exists in a certain set of factual
circumstances. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, as recently as
1971, so stated. " ' In using that simple analogy, McConnell and Benedict laid
the foundation for a broadening of and a deviation from the borrowed servant
doctrine. This resulted in a quite liberal approach to finding an operating surgeon vicariously liable for the negligence of those who are only tenuously subject
to the surgeon's right to control.
An example of the conceptual expansion can be found in Yorston v.
Pennell.42 It was the first Pennsylvania case finding the surgeon vicariously
liable for negligence occurring outside the operating room and in his absence.
The defendant surgeon was found liable for the negligence of an intern who
failed to record the patient's allergic sensitivity to penicillin while he was recording the patient's medical history in the emergency room. Furthermore, the actual
surgical procedure was performed by a hospital resident substituting for the sur36 The balancing of these competing concepts is discussed in this note in the section on
separation of responsibility, corresponding to notes 58-76 infra.
37 361 Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243 (1949).
38 Id. at 362, 65 A.2d at 246.
39 See Siidekum v. Animal Rescue League of Pittsburgh, 353 Pa. 408, 414, 45 A.2d 59,
61 (1946); see also Note, Pennsylvania's Captain-of-the-Ship Doctrine: A Mid-Twentieth
Century Anachronism, 71 Dicx. L. REv. 432, 434-35 (1967); 10 DUQ. L. Rav. 117 (1971).
40 384 Pa. 574, 122 A.2d 209 (1956).
41 See Thomas v. Hutchinson, 442 Pa. 118. 125, 275 A.2d 23, 27 (1971).
42 397 Pa. 28, 153 A.2d 255 (1959).

[Vol. 49:933]

NOTES

geon. Through a rather strained and technical connecting of the relationships, 3
the Court applied the captain of the ship analogy to find the requisite control
by the absent surgeon over the intern in the emergency room.
From this decision it is clear that Pennsylvania's captain of the ship doctrine
has a different emphasis, which reflects a different policy, from the borrowed servant cases discussed above. Yorston shows that the whole thrust
of captain of the ship doctrine hinges upon an inquiry into a right to control
rather than actual control or present supervision. The emphasis in McConnell
upon the presence of the surgeon" was no longer significant.
In Rockwell v. Kaplan5 and its companion case, Rockwell V. Stone," a
further extension is found. In Stone the court held that the anesthesiologist was
liable for the negligence of his subordinate in a pre-operative administering of
the anesthetic, sodium pentothal. Although not present at the time of the
mishap, Dr. Stone was the chief of the Anesthesiology Department and had
ordered the resident to administer the anesthetic. Surprisingly, the court in
Kaplan went on to decide that Dr. Kaplan, the surgeon, was also vicariously
liable, despite the fact that it was not established that the surgeon had any authority other than to order that the administering of the anesthetic begin in
preparation for surgery. It is, of course, clear that such authority is in fact a
right to control in the broadest sense, but two points about this right to control
are worthy of mention.
The first concerns the matter of the expertise possessed by an anesthesiologist
in his specialized field. The authority of the surgeon to order the beginning or
cessation of the administering of the anesthetic is in fact insufficient to establish
a master-servant relationship; in reality the relationship is one of the master
(the surgeon) to an independent contractor (the anesthesiologist) at least in
the absence of any conduct on the part of the surgeon which would suffice to
make the actions of the anesthesiologist his own.
The second point concerns policy. The attempt in the Rockwell decision
to base a finding of control completely upon the facts ignores the policy behind
McConnell and the cases limiting a surgeon's vicarious liability to the operating
room setting. Those cases reflect a judicial concern to limit the extent of respondeat superior in order to protect the hospital during the time the surgeon
is directing the operation and to protect the surgeon during the time that the
patient is subject to the activities of the hospital."
Two years after the Rockwell cases the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, applying Pennsylvania law, decided two companion cases
similar to Rockwell, with similar results-Mazer v. Lipschutz" and Mazer v.
Chodoff.50 The plaintiff-administrator brought a wrongful death action based
43 See discussion in Note, Pennsylvania's Captain-of-the-Ship Doctrine, supra note 39, at
436-38.
44 361 Pa. at 362, 65 A.2d at 246.
45 404 Pa. 574, 173 A.2d 54'(1961).
46 404 Pa. 561, 173 A.2d 48 (1961).
47 See discussion in the text corresponding to notes 24-32 supra.
48 See Laski, supra note 2, at 114: "The real problem in vicarious liability, in fact, is not
so much the rectitude of its basal principles, as the degree in which they are to be applied."
49 327 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1963).
50 Id.
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on the negligence of supplying a surgery patient with incompatible blood. Upon
receiving the fresh blood in the operating room, the anesthesiologist summoned
the blood bank technician to explain an apparent discrepancy in the labelling
of the pack. The technician explained to the anesthesiologist that the error was
merely clerical and that it was safe to administer. The court found that because of the negligence of the technician the anesthesiologist was not liable.
Yet, under the captain of the ship doctrine, it found that the surgeon was vicariously liable because he was in charge of the operating room at the time of
the discussion between the technician and the anesthesiologist."
In both Rockwell and Mazer it can be seen that the captain of the ship
doctrine vastly expands the liability of surgeons. In both cases the negligence
occurred out of the presence of the surgeon (in Rockwell, in the anesthesia
induction room; and in Mazer, in the laboratory) and was totally beyond his
ability to control. The result appears to be unjust.
In 1968 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court began to return from this extreme
position in the case of Collins v. Hand.5" The Court implicitly overruled Rockwell in holding that the mere right to order the beginning and end of performance
was insufficient control to establish a master-servant relationship. It pointed out
that:
[Tihe crucial test in determining whether an employee furnished to another
becomes the servant of the one to whom he is loaned is whether he passes
under the latter's right of control with regard not only to the work to be
s
done but also as to the manner of performing it.
As pointed out above, this view is more in keeping with the principles of general agency law and the recognition of the concept of the independent contractor.
The most recent Pennsylvania case has ostensibly brought the captain of
the ship doctrine to within the confines of the "borrowed servant" concept. In
Thomas v.Hutchinson5 the court said that "the 'captain of the ship' concept
is but the adaptation of the familiar 'borrowed servant' principle in the law of
agency to the operating room of a hospital."5 6 The lower court had directed a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of the surgeon's vicarious liability
for the negligence of the assisting residents after the surgeon had left the operating room. The two negligent physicians were surgical residents, employed and
selected by the hospital to assist in this particular operation. After successfully
removing a ruptured disc, the surgeon left the operating room as he allowed the
residents to close the incision and to remove the remaining sponges, but one of
the sponges was negligently left in the wound.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court made two major findings. First, it held
that the trial court was in error for directing the verdict on the issue of vicarious
liability based solely upon the pretrial deposition of the surgeon (he had died
51

See id. at 49-52.

52
53
54
55
56

431 Pa. 378, 246 A.2d 398 (1968).
Id. at 394, 246 A.2d at 406.
See text corresponding to notes 28-32 supra.
442 Pa. 118, 275 A.2d 23 (1971).
Id. at 125, 275 A.2d at 27.

JVol. 49:933]

NOTES

before the trial), that the residents were his assistants, and that he was directing
the operation. The master-servant relationship, the court said, was for the jury
to determine. Secondly, however, the court held that this decision was for the
jury to make solely on a factual basis. This view completely overlooks the nature
of respondeat superior liability as a creature of policy. As such the issue of the
master-servant relationship is a mixed question of law and fact, with the expectation that the court may direct a verdict when the facts are not substantially in
dispute and that, otherwise, the court will provide the jury with a standard to
which they may apply the facts.
This failing of the Thomas court appears to be the primary shortcoming of
the captain of the ship doctrine in its present status. Although the doctrine is
ostensibly limited to the operating room setting,57 the jury is allowed to roam too
freely with respondeat superior, a doctrine of policy which would better serve
both patient and physician (and, therefore, the ends of justice) were its scope to
be more clearly defined.
III. Separation of Responsibility in the Operating Room
A. The Surgeon and Hospital Employees
During the course of a surgical procedure in the operating room of a hospital, the control possessed by the surgeon in charge, whether described under the
captain of the ship doctrine or under the basic borrowed servant principle, is
quite uniformly recognized by the law as sufficient to create a master-servant
relationship between the surgeon and the employees.5 The corresponding vicarious liability of the surgeon for the negligence of a nurse, technician, orderly,
or other assistant seems appropriate in terms of the purpose of the doctrine of
respondeat superior. The surgeon is in fact in charge of the operation, giving
him both the right to control and actual control of all activities associated with
the procedure.
However, as was noted above," some courts have found the surgeon free
from vicarious liability for negligence occurring even in his presence where it
appears that the hospital employee is carrying out an activity which is more
properly characterized as a hospital or nursing task. The reasoning of those
cases gives little guidance; the courts seem to beg the question, finding simply
that there was no control.
Yet the thrust of the principle raised by those decisions is sound in its
attempt to recognize that a hospital, with its vast and complex framework for
patient care, has some form of independent service to provide, perhaps even in
the operating room. Each member of the surgical team is present in the operating room for a purpose, and the fact that the hospital employs, trains, and sets
standards for the surgical activities of the nurses, technicians, and orderlies belies
the fiction of exclusive control in the hands of the surgeon.
57
58
59

See Muller v. Likoff, 310 A.2d 303, 305 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973).
See discussion in text corresponding to notes 19-23 and 37-41 supra.
See discussion in text corresponding to notes 33-36 supra.
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Furthermore, although it might be properly said that these facts of modem
hospital life have no bearing upon the issue of liability without fault, it does not
follow that both the surgeon and the hospital may not be vicariously liable. As
can be seen by the Restatement, agency law recognizes that both masters could
well be liable:
Servant Acting for Two Masters
A person may be the servant of two masters, not joint employers, at one
time as to one act, if the service to one does not involve abandonment of
the service to the other."'
Both the surgeon and the hospital are acting to provide care for the patient, and
it is clear that the activities of the nurse serve that mutual interest of the two. 1
There are perhaps two principal reasons for the failure of courts to find
joint and several liability in the operating room context. The first is that, until
recently, the doctrines of charitable and governmental immunity62 have had an
effect upon the courts. This was recognized in Thomas v. Hutchinson8 where
the Court noted that the captain of the ship doctrine,
S.. was announced before the decision of this Court in Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., discarding the immunity from liability in tort previously enjoyed by public hospitals. In enunciating the "captain of the ship" theory in
McConnell, it was no coincidence that this Court noted, "if operating surgeons were not to be held liable for the negligent performance of the duties
of those then working under them, the law would fall in large measure to
afford a means of redress for preventable injuries sustained during the
course of such operations.""

The present trend toward eliminating the immunities65 should relieve the courts
of this concern to a great extent.
The second reason inclining the courts to look primarily to the surgeon for
vicarious liability is a feeling that it would not be appropriate to hold the hospital
The result in such a case
liable where a nurse was merely following orders.
a direct order from the
of
should and probably would be that the following
67
surgeon would place the liability back upon him.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 226 (1958).
See Dickerson v. American Sugar Refining Co., 211 F.2d 200, 203-04 '(3d Cir. 1954);
D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 499.
60

61

62 See 11A HOSPITAL LAw MANUAL, Negligence: Immunities to Suit (1973); see generally W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at §§ 131, 133.
63 442 Pa. 118, 275 A.2d 23 (1971).
64 Id. at 126, 275 A.2d at 27 (footnote omitted).
65 R. GOODMAN & L. GOLDSMITH, MODERN HOSPITAL LIABILITY:
368, 371 (1972). The present status of the immunities is set forth in W.
1, at 983-87 and 994-96.

66

See D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 5, 499-500.

LAW AND TACTICS
PROSSER, supra note

67 Id. The principle of joint and several liability in the borrowed servant context is
proposed and defended in Skogland, supra note 14, at 317-21.
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B. The Surgeon and Other Physicians
The most common situation involving multiple physicians in the same operating room is the basic surgical procedure with one surgeon and one anesthesiologist. As was pointed out above,68 many courts have felt that the individual
expertise of the specialist in anesthesiology precludes viewing him as the servant
of the surgeon.
This view is supported under a contract theory, as can be seen in Wiley V.
Wharton,69 where the court concluded that a contract for professional services
arose between the patient and the anesthesiologist, despite the fact that the
anesthesiologist had been recommended by the surgeon. The result could, of
course, be different if the surgeon had entered into a contract with the patient
to perform the anesthesia service as well as the surgery. The view is also supported by the expectations of the patient. The anesthesiologist today makes
rounds in the hospital to see his patients in much the same way as does the
surgeon. In such a situation it is difficult to imagine how a patient could view
the surgeon as the "ostensible owner" ' or master of the anesthesiologist.
The independence of the anesthesiologist is most strongly mandated by the
expert nature of his specialized field under the basic agency principle of the
independent contractor."1 The expertise of the anesthesiologist was recognized in
Huber v.ProtestantDeaconess Hospital Association72' where the court pointed
out:
In this age of specialization in the practice of medicine it is the duty
and function of courts of law to apply rules of law with an intelligent understanding of developing civilization in the field of medicine and surgery....
While [the surgeon] requested that the hospital furnish an anesthetist
it appears to this court that there is nothing shown in the circumstances of
this record, when applied to the existing rules of law, which would render
73
. ..[the surgeon] liable for the negligent acts of this trained specialist.
A number of other cases have found this reasoning compelling and have been led
by the facts of modem medicine to reach a similar conclusion.'
68 See discussion in text corresponding to notes 24-27 supra.
69 68 Ohio App. 345, 41 N.E.2d 255 (1941).
70 "Ostensible owner" is an agency principle holding one liable for the negligence of
another if he allows himself to appear to be the master of the other; see Santise v. Martins Inc.,
258 App. Div. 663, 17 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1940); see also Howard v. Park, 37 Mich. App. 496,

195 N.W.2d 496 (1972).

71 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958), for a list of factors to be
considered in distinguishing between a servant and an independent contractor.
72 127 Ind. App. 565, 133 N.E.2d 864 '(1956).
73 Id. at 576-77, 133 N.E.2d at 869-70.
74 Dohr v. Smith, 104 So. 2d 29, 32 (Fla. 1958):
[It is clear to us that he [the surgeon] and the anesthetist were working in highly

expert fields peculiar to each and that despite the common goal, the successful

repair of the patient's ulcer, their responsibilities were not inextricably bound
together.
Thompson v. Lillehei, 164 F. Supp. 716, 721 (D. Minn. 1958):
And even assuming that Lillehei was "surgeon-in-charge" or "Captain of the
Ship," as urged, does it follow that he is responsible for the negligence, if any, of
an anesthesiologist such as Dr. X, assigned to the case by his own superior, exercising
his own independent special medical knowledge in performing his duties without

any specific directions from Lillehei? I don't think so....
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In addition to the anesthesiologist there will likely be found a greater
number of other specialists in the operating room as surgeons' medical practice
broadens and as more particular specialization arises to cope with the wider
scope. In a complicated surgical procedure with more than one specialist operating, the division of responsibility among the surgeons themselves is a difficult
issue. As stated by Professors Louisell and Williams:
While definite allocation of responsibility between anesthesiologist and
surgeon is relatively easy to effect on a sensible basis, uncritical extension of
the policy of such allocation to other relationships is fraught with danger to
the patient .. .[S]ome situations in modern surgery appear so complex,

particularly when.., an unusually large number of people participate, that
there should be one person,
. . charged with the coordination and super75
vision of all procedures.
Any dispute over the propriety or degree of division of responsibilities in the
operating room must focus primarily upon the benefit to be given to the patient.
To begin with it is axiomatic that the patient will gain from the increased medical
knowledge and talents of surgeons who choose to study in more specialized fields.
What remains unclear is whether the legal response to the increased specialization should be a blind reflection of the separation of medical expertise or whether
it should ignore the fact of medical progress and adhere to a doctrine that may
be both obsolete and unjust in light of the realities of modem medicine.
A step in the right direction, however, would be an acceptance of legal
reality and an abandoning of troublesome legal fictions like the captain of the
ship doctrine. "Like most of its kind... [it] . ..is simply a stumbling block in
the pathway of juristic progress. It is one of those dangerous generalizations
which shivers into untruth upon the approach of fact."7'

Liability without fault

should be recognized and approached as a principle of policy.
The policy, that underlying respondeat superior,is substantially designed for
the benefit of innocent plaintiffs, and yet it is artificially limited by its own terms.
Indeed, this artificiality gives the principle one of its greatest advantages: stability. Once it is accepted that there is a division of responsibility between the
surgeon and the anesthesiologist, there arises a need for the law to allocate, in
whatever proportion, the responsibility among the other possible participants in
an operation. When there are multiple surgical specialists working on the same
operation, each owes the same high degree of care to the helpless patient. Each
should be directly liable to the patient, therefore, to the degree that he exercises
his independent judgement. When a hospital employee is involved the hospital

To extend the doctrine of respondeat superior to a situation such as that reflected in the evidence would be to strain the doctrine beyond the basis for its
creation.
Brossard v. Koop, 200 Minn. 410, 274 N.W. 241 (1937); see also Morey v. Thybo, 199 F.
760 (7th Cir. 1912).
75 D. LouISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 503-04. A student commentator, himself a medical doctor, disagrees: see Note, Pennsylvania's Captain-of-the-Ship Doctrine, supra

note 39, at 448-50.
76 Laski, supra note 2, at 107.
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should be subject to vicarious liability, and the surgeon using his services should
be jointly liable.
A properly delineated separation of responsibility would serve the medical
profession by providing a stable legal principle and the patient by assuring him
that the law will provide him with a means of recourse against whoever might
be deriving profit from this particular aspect of society's growing complexity.

I. Talbot Young, Jr.

